Sparse potpensity method

Cause

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Effect

Sadržaj

1 The logic of causation

Cause and effect Hume Counterfactual approach



2 Statistical answer to logical problem.

Neyman, 1923. Randomization Additional constraints



3 Cause and effect

The logic of causation

To formalize the theory we should:

• setup the meaning of notions like:

events, cause, effect, similar world...

• setup the meaning of 'conclusion'

A causes $B (A \rightsquigarrow B)$

and the negation of an event.

• setup the rules of assigning the truth value to hypothetical sentences. For instance:

Had Franz Ferdinand not been shot, WW1 would not have occurred.

Is it truth or not? Is it true in this world or in hypothetical world?

Hume vs. Lewis

Hume:¹

... what one does have is the constant conjunction of cause C and effect E and the expectation that E will follow C.

May be more formally:

... we may define the relation of cause and effect such that *where*, *if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.*

Lewis (1973) — counterfactual approach:

¹A Treatise of Human Nature & An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

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Counterfactual approach

Counterfactual (Lewis, 1973)

A is the cause of B $(A \leadsto B)$ if and only if:

- (1) $A \rightarrow B$ (if A were to occur B would occur) A implies B.
- (2) $A \square \rightarrow B$ (if B were not to occur A would not occur)

Counterfactual (Lewis, 1973)

A is the cause of B $(A \leftrightarrow B)$ if and only if:

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(2) $A \square \rightarrow B$ (if B were not to occur A would not occur)

It may be shown that (1) and (2) are necessary conditions for causality, but not sufficient.

(3) $B \square \rightarrow A$ (if A were not to occur B would not occur)

Neyman (1923), Quine (1960), Mill (1843) are also speaking of counterfactuals.

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Weakness of Lewis approach:

- his causal relation is symmetric
- early preemption
- late preemption
- trumping
- A possible correction: *causal chain*.

Influence (Lewis, 2000)

In his new theory Lewis is talking about *influence* instead of *causality* and introduces the *chain of influence* fro A to B.

Still, there is a problem with backward transitivity.

The principle of individual choice. In the causal history of an event we choose an event as the cause which offers a *reasonable* explanation of the causal chain. 'Reasonable' is context dependent²

Explanation is 'epistemic notion', causality is 'metaphysical relation'.

²Because of that we are speaking about individual choice $\rightarrow \langle a \rangle \rightarrow \langle a \rangle \rightarrow \langle a \rangle$

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Are we are coming back to Hume??!!

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Neyman, 1923.

Neyman, 1923. Statistical answer to logical problem.

- A a finite set of entities (population).
- T a treatment with measurable effect Y.
- \bar{Y} a parameter of distribution Y (usualy E(Y))
- C another treatment (control).
- $\bar{Y}_{A,T}$ expectation E(Y|T).

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- A a finite set of entities (population). T - a treatment with measurable effect Y. $\overline{Y} - a$ parameter of distribution Y (usualy E(Y)) C - another treatment (control). $\overline{Y}_{A,T} - expectation E(Y|T).$
- $\bar{Y}_{A,C}$ expectation E(Y|C) (counterfactual world)

Definition. Causal effect of T with respect to C is the difference

$$\tau = \bar{Y}_{A,T} - \bar{Y}_{A,C}.$$

We are reading $\bar{Y}_{A,T}$ (real world), not $\bar{Y}_{A,C}$ (imaginal world). How to manage such missing data situation?

Nevman, 1923.

Neyman – A replacement for counterfactual world?

A – the population exposed to the treatment T and $\overline{Y}_{A,C}$ is not measurable.

 B^3 – another population exposed to the (control) C. Let us consider $\bar{Y}_{A,T} - \bar{Y}_{B,C}$. Ideal situation: $\forall i \in A$ there is a twin $i' \in A$. The first is treated, the second is controlled, and we have a difference

$$Y(i|T) - Y(i'|C), \ i, i'$$
 tweens.

If we 'forget' the twin i' we think of two *potential values* $\{Y_{iT}, Y_{iC}\}$ of which only one is 'readable' depending if the entity is treated or controlled. T is then the indicator for treated group. Let us define $Y_i := (1 - T_i)Y_{iC} + T_iY_{iT}$, and

$$\tau := E(Y_i | T_i = 1) - E(Y_i | T_i = 0).$$

³Should be 'close' to the real world.

The logic of causation

Randomization

Randomization (Rubin)

$$\tau := E(Y_i | T_i = 1) - E(Y_i | T_i = 0).$$
(1)

Formula (1) is meaningful if the *group affiliation* is independent of Y, i.e. $E(Y_i|T) = E(Y_i)$. Then

$$\tau := E(Y_{iT}) - E(Y_{iC}).$$

Independence may be guaranteed ba random⁴ choice of treated units.

See also: v. Russo, Wunsch, Mouchart, Inferring Causality through Counterfactuals in Observational Studies, Some epistemological issues (2010)

⁴Which is not allways possible

Additional constraints

- Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
- (A) $\{Y_{iT}, Y_{iC}\} \perp T | X \text{ i } (B) \quad 0 < Pr(T = 1 | X) < 1$, for each covariate X (A-independence, B-overlapping)
- balance

$$\tau | (T = 1) = E[(E(Y_{iT}|X, T = 1) - E(Y_{iC}|X, T = 0))|T = 1],$$

where the outer expectation is taken over the restriction X|T == 1.

Matching, i.e. looking for twins may be done by NN, Mahalanobis distance or by using the distance on some scale like *propensity scale*.

A recent paper: *Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching* (Gary King-Nielsen-November, 2018) Potential enters the game

Potential method: Working plan

Observational data:

item id	T or C	covariates X	Y
i	Т		Y_i
j	С		Y_j
		• • •	• • •
п	С		Y _n

much more C's than T's

A rough procedure...

- 1. $\forall i \text{ (treated) find a } twin i' \text{ (controlled) and observe the difference } \tau_i = Y_i Y_{i'}$. What is the definition of twin?
 - If X's have the same values for i and i' we have a *twin*.
 - If not, find a set of *proxy twins*.
- 2. Construct some scale on the set of *treated + proxy twins*.
- 3. From the distance matrix create optimal matching.
- 4. Calculate mean effect.

Working plan – details

- Some factors (covariates) generate a stratified population.
- The *proxy twins* should be in the same strata.
- We will use *potential* as the scale. Usually it is generated by generalized (logistic) regression.

The good side of potential is that it allows missing data – sparse covariates values.

The difficulty is that PM forces the user to specify the trade off between the covariate units. This may be avoided by standardization of data, normalizing each column to the same $flownorm^5$.

- Now we have potential scale on each strata.
- The final step is to use the Hungarian method for matching.

⁵Analogy with dividing by SD.

Experiment, LaLonde

An example: lalonde data

A tibble: 16,289 x 8

item	treated	age	education	married	nodegree	ejump	etnic
<chr></chr>	<fct></fct>	<dbl></dbl>	<dbl></dbl>	<fct></fct>	<fct></fct>	<dbl></dbl>	<fct></fct>
E1	1	37	11	1	1	9930.	В
E2	1	22	9	0	1	3596.	Н
E3	1	30	12	0	0	24909.	В
E4	1	27	11	0	1	7506.	В
E7	1	23	12	0	0	0	В
E8	1	32	11	0	1	8472.	В
E9	1	22	16	0	0	2164.	В
E10	1	33	12	1	0	12418.	0

... with 16,279 more rows

treated	n
<fct></fct>	<int></int>
0	15992
1	297

Experiment, LaLonde

Hungarian matching (strata="10B")

get_strata_data(data, strata=c("1", "0", "B"))

# A ti	ibble: 1	6 x 9							
item	treated	age	edu	marr	nodeg	ejump	etnic	Х	
< chr >	<fct></fct>	<dbl></dbl>	<dbl></dbl>	<fct></fct>	<fct></fct>	<dbl></dbl>	<fct></fct>	<dbl></dbl>	
E1450	0	23	12	1	0	3210.	В	-0.886	
E8055	0	42	14	1	0	1261.	В	4.11	
E1893	0	23	12	1	0	331.	В	-0.886	
E862	0	27	12	1	0	-2274.	В	-0.360	
E1965	0	26	12	1	0	-83.6	5 B	-0.492	
E1701	0	27	12	1	0	-2702.	В	-0.360	
E40	1	23	12	1	0	5912.	В	-0.886	
E61	1	42	14	1	0	13168.	В	4.11	
E183	1	23	12	1	0	-4796.	В	-0.886	
E239	1	27	12	1	0	-5029.	В	-0.360	
E271	1	26	12	1	0	-4370.	В	-0.492	
E283	1	27	12	1	0	-334.	В	-0.360	
)4(

Experiment, LaLonde

Effect by strata

Size by a	strata:	Effect by strata:	Overall effect:
1 00B	203	eff(00B) = 2382.36	513.2903.
2 00H	22	eff(00H) = 5168.931	
3 000	376	eff(000) = -56.78306	
4 01B	276	eff(01B) = -163.8093	
5 01H	70	eff(01H) = -2023.542	
6 010	250	eff(010) = -570.09	
7 10B	57	eff(10B) = 2644.577	
8 10H	14	eff(10H) = 3927.748	
9 100	236	eff(100) = -4383.368	
10 11B	121	eff(11B) = 2794.743	
11 11H	8	eff(11H) = -8109.565	
12 110	39	eff(110) = 1507.999	

Olmos & Govindasamy, Propensity Scores: A Practical Introduction Using R (2015), propensity score (effect): 326.3214

The final effect

We are interpreting the effect of the cause, not he cause of the effect.

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Literatura

Experiment, LaLonde





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Potential Method⁶

 \mathcal{F}_{α}

Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

		noc	les _n		flow
arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}
α	-1	1	0	0	1



⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)



Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

		nodes,						
arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}			
α	-1	1	0	0	1			
β	0	-1	1	0	3			

Preference flow \mathcal{F}

⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)



Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

			nodes _n						
	arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}			
-	α	-1	1	0	0	1			
	β	0	-1	1	0	3			
	γ	-1	0	1	0	4			

Preference flow \mathcal{F}

$$\mathcal{F}_{\alpha} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} - \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} = 0$$

⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017) 🛛 🗤 🖘 👘 🖘 👘 🔊 ९९



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		nodes,						
arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}			
α	-1	1	0	0	1			
β	0	$^{-1}$	1	0	3			
γ	-1	0	1	0	4			
δ	0	1	0	-1	2			
ϵ	0	0	-1	1	2			

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$$\mathcal{F}_{\alpha} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} - \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} = 0$$

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ϵ	0	0	$^{-1}$	1	2			

Preference flow \mathcal{F}

 $egin{array}{lll} \mathcal{F}_lpha+\mathcal{F}_eta-\mathcal{F}_\gamma=0\ \mathcal{F}_\epsilon+\mathcal{F}_\delta+\mathcal{F}_eta=7 \end{array}$

 \mathcal{F} cycle DBCD is not consistent!

⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017) (D) (D) (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)



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arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}			
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 $N(A^{\tau}) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$

Preference flow \mathcal{F}

$$\begin{split} \mathcal{F}_{\alpha} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} - \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} &= 0\\ \mathcal{F}_{\epsilon} + \mathcal{F}_{\delta} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} &= 7\\ \mathcal{F} \text{ cycle DBCD is not consistent!} \end{split}$$

⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)



Preference flow \mathcal{F}

 $\mathcal{F}_{lpha} + \mathcal{F}_{eta} - \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} = 0$ $\mathcal{F}_{\epsilon} + \mathcal{F}_{\delta} + \mathcal{F}_{eta} = 7$

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Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

		nodes _n						
arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}			
α	-1	1	0	0	1			
β	0	-1	1	0	3			
γ	-1	0	1	0	4			
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ϵ	0	0	-1	1	2			

 $N(A^{\tau}) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^m$ $c \oplus \mathcal{F}_o = \mathcal{F}$



Preference flow \mathcal{F}

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 \mathcal{F} cycle DBCD is not consistent!

Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

	nodes,				flow
arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}
α	-1	1	0	0	1
β	0	-1	1	0	3
γ	-1	0	1	0	4
δ	0	1	0	-1	2
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 $N(A^{\tau}) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^{m}$ $c \oplus \mathcal{F}_{o} = \mathcal{F}$ $\mathcal{F} \text{ is consistent iff } \mathcal{F} \in R(A)$



 $\begin{aligned} \mathcal{F}_{\alpha} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} - \mathcal{F}_{\gamma} &= 0\\ \mathcal{F}_{\epsilon} + \mathcal{F}_{\delta} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} &= 7\\ \mathcal{F} \text{ cycle DBCD is not consistent!} \end{aligned}$

Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

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arcs _m	A	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}
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$$\begin{split} \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{A}^{\tau}) \oplus \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}) &= \mathbb{R}^{m} \\ c \oplus \mathcal{F}_{o} &= \mathcal{F} \\ \mathcal{F} \text{ is consistent iff } \mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}) \\ \mathcal{F} \text{ je consistent iff } \mathcal{A}X &= \mathcal{F} \end{split}$$

⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017) 🛛 🗤 🖘 🖉 🖉 🕫



 $\mathcal{F}_{\epsilon} + \mathcal{F}_{\delta} + \mathcal{F}_{\beta} = 7$ \mathcal{F} cycle DBCD is not consistent! Incidence matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

		flow			
arcs _m	Α	В	С	D	\mathcal{F}
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β	0	-1	1	0	3
γ	-1	0	1	0	4
δ	0	1	0	$^{-1}$	2
ϵ	0	0	-1	1	2

 $N(A^{\tau}) \oplus R(A) = \mathbb{R}^{m}$ $c \oplus \mathcal{F}_{o} = \mathcal{F}$ \mathcal{F} is consistent iff $\mathcal{F} \in R(A)$ \mathcal{F} je consistent iff $AX = \mathcal{F}$ \mathcal{F} je consistent iff $c \perp \mathcal{F}, \forall c$ $c \in N(A^{\tau})$ cycle ⁶Čaklović (2012); Čaklović and Kurdija (2017)

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Graf preferencije

Potential of preference graph

A — incidence matrix, n = #Vertices, m = #Arcs. \mathcal{F} — preference flow.

Ranking of the vertices is given by *potential* X:

$$A^{\tau}AX = A^{\tau}\mathcal{F}.$$

 $A^{\tau}\mathcal{F}$ — flow gain in vertices $L = A^{\tau}A$ — Laplace matrix of the graph.

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 $A^{\tau}\mathcal{F}$ — flow gain in vertices

 $L = A^{\tau}A$ — Laplace matrix of the graph.

For connected graph, the matrix A has range n - 1, the kernel is generated by the vector of ones $\mathbb{1} = [1, 1, ..., 1]^{\tau}$. For uniqueness of X we put the condition

$$\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 0$$



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Bibliography

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